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Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. Rigby, 2016 UT App 42, 369 P.3d 127 (Addendum A). 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) 
(West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
 Does the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the 
Utah Constitution’s search and seizure provision, art. I, § 14, require an exi-
gency apart from the mobility of the automobile? 
 Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews de novo 
the decision of the court of appeals. State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶13, 296 P.3d 
673. “That said, ‘[t]he correctness of the court of appeals’ decision turns, in 
-2- 
part, on whether it accurately reviewed the trial court’s decision under the 
appropriate standard of review.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 
¶15, 144 P.3d 1096). A trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress is a 
mixed question of law and fact. The court’s interpretation of the Utah Con-
stitution is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Casey, 2002 
UT 29, ¶19, 44 P.3d 756. The court’s other legal conclusions are also re-
viewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its application of the le-
gal standard to the facts. State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶17, 332 P.3d 937. But its 
underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id.  
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Const. art. I, § 14 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
 In March 2013, Deputy Brian Groves of the Cache County Sheriff’s 
Office stopped the car Defendant was driving for running a stop sign. R82. 
Upon approaching the car, Deputy Groves “immediately detect[ed] the 
odor of both burnt and fresh marijuana coming from the vehicle.” R82-83. 
-3- 
During the stop, Deputy Groves also noticed that Defendant and his two 
passengers were exhibiting “physical indicators of recent marijuana use,” 
R82-83, including bloodshot eyes, droopy eyelids, a stoned look, and ex-
treme nervousness. R60; Rigby, 2016 UT App 42, ¶3. A drug K-9 unit was 
summoned to the scene, arrived shortly after, and “positively indicated on 
the vehicle.” R83. Officers thereafter searched the car and—after finding a 
small metal pipe for smoking marijuana and plastic bag of fresh marijua-
na—arrested Defendant. R60,83; Rigby, 2016 UT App 42, ¶3.  
B. Summary of proceedings. 
 Defendant was charged with (1) driving with a measurable controlled 
substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor, (2) possession of a controlled 
substance in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, (3) possession of 
drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, and (4) 
failure to stop at a stop sign, a class C misdemeanor. R1-2. Defendant 
moved to suppress the drug evidence. R39-44. Following briefing and ar-
gument, R51-55,63-65,76, the trial court denied the motion on two inde-
pendent grounds: (1) the warrantless search of the car was justified under 
the State automobile exception to the warrant requirement; and (2) the war-
rantless search of the car was justified by probable cause for Defendant’s 
search and arrest. R82-85 (Addendum C). 
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 Defendant thereafter pled guilty to driving with a measurable con-
trolled substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor, and possession of a 
controlled substance, reduced to a class B misdemeanor, and the remaining 
charges were dismissed. R93-95. In so pleading, Defendant reserved his 
right to appeal the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress. R95. 
Defendant was sentenced to 180 days in jail on both counts, with all but two 
days suspended, and placed on supervised probation for one year. R107-08.  
 On appeal, Defendant challenged only the trial court’s conclusion that 
the search was justified by the State automobile exception. Rigby, 2016 UT 
App 42, ¶6. He did not challenge the trial court’s other basis for denying his 
motion—i.e., that the warrantless search of the car was justified by the drug 
arrest. See id. at ¶¶ 7-29. Even though Defendant failed to challenge all of 
the bases for the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion, the court of 
appeals nevertheless addressed his sole challenge and held that the State 
automobile exception mirrors the federal exception: “we decline to depart 
from the path of federal law and conclude that under the automobile excep-
tion, ... the law enforcement officers in this case were only required to have 
probable cause to justify the search of Rigby’s vehicle.” Id. at ¶28.  
 Defendant petitioned for a writ of certiorari and, after the State stipu-
lated thereto, this Court granted review. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The trial court denied Defendant’s suppression motion for two rea-
sons: (1) the warrantless search of the car was justified under the State au-
tomobile exception to the warrant requirement; and (2) the warrantless 
search of the car was justified by virtue of probable cause supporting De-
fendant’s arrest. Defendant challenged only one of those grounds on direct 
appeal. Accordingly, any decision on that ground cannot result in reversal 
of the trial court’s order. This Court should therefore affirm the court of ap-
peals’ decision on the alternative ground that Defendant has failed to 
demonstrate why the trial court’s order should be reversed. 
 In any event, the court of appeals correctly held that the State auto-
mobile exception to the warrant requirement is the same as the federal ex-
ception. The framers of the Utah Constitution, and the people who ratified 
it, intended that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution guarantee the 
same protections as those afforded under the Fourth Amendment. Defend-
ant has not demonstrated otherwise. Indeed, the history of Section 14, as 
well as the historical case law governing searches of vehicles on the thor-
oughfares, demonstrates that a warrant is not required for mobile vehicles 
stopped so long as there exists probable cause to believe contraband will be 




This Court should affirm the court of appeals’ opinion 
on the alternative ground that Defendant failed on direct 
appeal to challenge all of the grounds upon which the 
district court denied his motion to suppress. 
 This Court should affirm the court of appeals’ decision affirming the 
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, but should do so on alterna-
tive grounds. The issue raised on direct appeal, and again on certiorari re-
view, was not the sole basis for the district court’s denial of Defendant’s mo-
tion to suppress. The district court denied the suppression motion on two, 
independent grounds—either of which supported its ruling. The court of 
appeals’ opinion is thus advisory, and would, in no event affect the district 
court’s ruling. This Court should thus affirm on the alternative ground that 
Defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying his 
suppression motion. 
 This Court has observed that “one of the most fundamental principles 
of the appellate process” is that the appellant “identify ... flaws in the dis-
trict court’s order that require[ ] reversal.” Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶4, 194 
P.3d 903. If an appellant “fails to attack the district court’s reasons” for 
denying relief requested in the trial court, he “cannot demonstrate that the 
district court erred” in denying that relief and he cannot prevail on appeal. 
-7- 
Golden Meadows Properties, LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App 257, ¶17, 241 P.3d 375. 
Utah appellate courts thus “will not reverse a ruling of the trial court that 
rests on independent alternative grounds where the appellant challenges 
only one of those grounds.” Salt Lake County v. Butler, Crockett & Walsh De-
velopment Corp., 2013 UT App 30, 297 P.3d 38.  
 Nor is it proper for the Court to opine on issues that are not disposi-
tive. Where any direction the Court “ ‘may provide ... may ultimately prove 
to be irrelevant,’ or where there are ‘possible circumstances under which 
[the Court] would not need to address [a constitutional claim],’ to do so 
would be to impermissibly render an advisory opinion.” Clegg v. Wasatch 
County, 2010 UT 5,¶26, 227 P.3d 1243 (quoting Pett v. Autoliv ASP Inc., 2005 
UT 2, ¶5, 106 P.3d 705, and State v. Ortiz, 1999 UT 84, ¶4, 987 P.2d 39).  
 Defendant argued below that, unlike the federal automobile excep-
tion to the warrant requirement, the State automobile exception requires ex-
igency apart from a vehicle’s mobility to justify a warrantless search. R39-
44,63-64. He contended that there was no such exigency here and that the 
warrantless search of the car thus violated Section 14 of the Utah Constitu-
tion’s Declaration of Rights. R39-44,63-64,120-26.  
 The district denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, but on two inde-
pendent grounds. The court ruled that under the automobile exception ar-
-8- 
ticulated in State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996), the warrantless 
search was justified because the officers had probable cause, “the vehicle 
was mobile[,] and the occupants were alerted to police presence.” R83-84.1 
But the court ruled that the warrantless search was also justified for another 
independent reason. In its oral ruling, the court explained that the question 
is whether an officer can “arrest a person and then search the vehicle for 
suspected contraband ... which constituted the probable cause for the arrest 
in the first place.” R138-39. The court concluded that an officer can. It ruled 
that such a search is “a natural extension of the person of the Defendant” 
because “probable cause existed to question and search the Defendant for 
illegal drugs,” R84, and also to “take [him] from the vehicle and arrest him,” 
R140.  
 The district court’s ruling that the warrantless search of Defendant’s 
car was justified by the probable cause for Defendant’s arrest is consistent 
with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Arizona v. Gant, the United 
States Supreme Court held that “circumstances unique to the vehicle con-
text justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to be-
                                              
1 Two signed, but different, orders denying the motion to suppress 
appear in the record. R78-81; R82-85. The district court, however, struck the 
first order. R90. In addressing the State automobile exception, the court of 
appeals mistakenly relied on language from the district court’s stricken or-
der. See Rigby, 2016 UT App 42, ¶4 (quoting R80). 
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lieve evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehi-
cle.’ ” 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 
615, 632 (2004)). Gant explained that “when a recent occupant is arrested for 
a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle 
contains relevant evidence.” Id. at 343-44. But in other cases, like here, “the 
offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compart-
ment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.” Id. at 344.  
 The district court did not rely on Gant, but came to the same conclu-
sion under its analysis of the Utah Constitution’s reasonableness require-
ment. R129 (observing that “the case before us is a Utah constitutional 
case”). The court reasoned that “under the totality of the circumstances and 
in balancing the interests of the State and the Defendant’s privacy, the 
search of the vehicle in this matter was reasonable and was therefore lawful 
and valid.” R84; accord R141-42. The court explained that under such cir-
cumstances, it is not reasonable to “burden officers with using their mobile 
technology just because it exists in their vehicles.” R84; accord R140.  
 On direct appeal, Defendant challenged only the district court’s ap-
plication of the automobile exception under Anderson. He did not challenge 
the district court’s independent State ground for denying the motion based 
on the same rationale applied in Gant. Accordingly, the court of appeals’ 
-10- 
opinion on the automobile exception is advisory only. No matter what that 
court held on the automobile exception, it could not affect the district 
court’s order denying the motion to suppress. So too on certiorari review. 
Even if this Court were to disagree with the court of appeals’ opinion on the 
automobile exception, that holding would not be sufficient to reverse the 
district court’s judgment and would amount to no more than an advisory 
opinion. This Court should therefore affirm the court of appeals’ opinion, 
but on the alternative ground that Defendant failed to demonstrate why 
“the district court’s order ... require[s] reversal.” Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶4. 
II. 
In any event, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that 
the automobile exception to the Utah Constitution’s war-
rant requirement should be different that the federal au-
tomobile exception. 
 This Court has observed that “federal Fourth Amendment protections 
may differ from those guaranteed our citizens by [Section 14 of] our state 
constitution.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 506 (empha-
sis added), overruled on other grounds, 547 U.S. 398 (2006); accord State v. 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶34, 162 P.3d 1106. But as recognized by the court of 
appeals below, this Court has historically “considered the protections af-
forded to be one and the same.” State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 
1988). Even in those rare cases where the Court has examined an issue un-
-11- 
der an independent state constitutional analysis, it has generally adopted 
the Fourth Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶ 19, 
996 P.2d 546 (adopting the “analysis and rationale” of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence in examining administrative highway checkpoints); Watts, 
750 P.2d at 1221 (holding that like the Fourth Amendment, Section 14 does 
not protect against unreasonable private searches); Sims v. Collection Div. of 
the Utah State Tax Comm’n, 841 P.2d 6, 10, 14-15 (Utah 1992) (plurality opin-
ion) (adopting analysis and rationale of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsyl-
vania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), in concluding that quasi-criminal proceedings are 
subject to the exclusionary rule).  
 In only one circumstance has a majority of this Court held that Sec-
tion 14 provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment.  In State v. 
Thompson, the court held that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, Section 14 
recognizes a legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records. 810 P.2d 415, 
417-18 (Utah 1991) (rejecting the rationale of United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435 442 (1976)).2 One other case often cited as an example of providing 
                                              
2 The protection afforded to bank records, however, was also provid-
ed by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-45(1) (1990) (providing that the 
State may not obtain bank records by subpoena “without first obtaining 
written permission from the person whose financial transactions or other 
records of financial condition are to be examined, or obtaining an order 
from a court of competent jurisdiction permitting access to the infor-
mation”). 
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greater protections garnered the support of only a plurality: State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460, 464-71 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (concluding, in essence, 
that a car thief has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the stolen car).  
 In sum, “the truism that article I, section 14 may provide greater pro-
tections to Utah citizens than the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Worwood, 
2007 UT 47, ¶19, 164 P.3d 397, does not mean that it provides broader pro-
tections generally.  
A. When interpreting article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitu-
tion, this Court should first look to the purpose and intent of 
its framers and the people who ratified it.  
 The threshold question is whether this Court should concern itself at 
all with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when examining Section 14, and 
if so, under what circumstances it should “depart from federal Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and chart [its] own course.” State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 
¶16 n.2, 2004 UT 95. The answer to that question has long evaded a majority 
of this Court. See Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8 (observing that “a somewhat 
different construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating 
this state’s citizenry from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given 
to the fourth amendment by federal courts”); State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 
1229, 1235 (Utah 1996) (Russon, J., joined by Howe, J., for plurality) (“Utah 
courts should construe article I, section 14 in a manner similar to construc-
-13- 
tions of the Fourth Amendment except in compelling circumstances”), id. at 
1239-40 (Stewart, J., concurring in result) (opining that “Utah ought not de-
part from federal search and seizure law in construing article I, section 14 
simply because of some inconsistency in that law, or minor disagreement 
with it,” but declining “to adopt the ‘compelling circumstances’ standard”); 
id. at 1241 (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting) (rejecting state constitu-
tional analysis that is “presumptively dependent on federal law”). This 
Court should answer that question by turning to an examination of the in-
tent and purpose of the framers who adopted the state constitution and of 
the people who ratified it. 
 “It is a cardinal rule of construction that constitutions should be con-
strued in light of their framers’ intent.” American Fork v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 
1069, 1072 (Utah 1985). In discerning that intent, “the starting point should 
always be the plain meaning of the textual language” itself.  American Bush 
v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶115, 140 P.3d 1235 (Durham, C.J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); accord Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, at ¶ 37.  
This textual analysis should also include an examination of “other [related] 
constitutional provisions.” West, 872 P.2d at 1015.  
 When the intent of the framers cannot be clearly discerned from the 
text of a provision and related provisions, the Court has “inform[ed] its tex-
-14- 
tual interpretation with historical evidence of the framers’ intent.” American 
Bush, 2006 UT 40, ¶10. This may include (1) “‘the background out of which 
[the provision] arose,’” id. (citation omitted); (2) the debates at the 1895 Utah 
Constitutional Convention, American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 
1072-73 (Utah 1985); (3) the historical source of the provision, such as the 
common law, id. at 1071-73; (4) statutory law enacted by the first Utah Leg-
islature, P.I.E. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Utah 
1988); (5) “court decisions made contemporaneously to the framing of 
Utah’s constitution in sister states with similar . . . constitutional provi-
sions,” American Bush, 2006 UT 40, at ¶ 11; (6) “the unique history” of the 
state, Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993); 
and (7) the “state’s particular . . . traditions,” West v. Thomson Newspapers, 
872 P.2d 999, 1013 (Utah 1994).  
 In Tiedemann, the Court observed that historical arguments “do not 
represent a sine qua non in constitutional analysis.” 2007 UT 49, at ¶ 37. The 
Court held that state constitutional analysis may also “rely on whatever as-
sistance legitimate sources may provide in the interpretive process.” Id.  
This is a marked departure from Utah jurisprudence. The Court thus sug-
gested that it “‘may also look to . . . sister state law, and policy arguments in 
the form of economic and sociological materials to assist . . . in arriving at a 
-15- 
proper interpretation of the provision in question.’” Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 
at ¶ 37 (citation omitted). But in Whitehead—the source of this language—
the Court explained that “[e]ach of these types of evidence can help in di-
vining the intent and purpose of the framers, a critical aspect of any constitu-
tional interpretation.” Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 921 n.6 (emphasis added). In 
other words, despite its expressed willingness to look at non-textual or non-
historical evidence, the Court in Whitehead viewed “divining the intent and 
purpose of the framers” as the ultimate purpose for looking at those 
sources.  
 Tiedemann suggested that federal analysis which is flawed, confusing, 
or inconsistent may also justify independent analysis. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 
49, at ¶ 37 (citing State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 467-70 (Utah 1990) (plurality 
opinion), and State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988)).  But a per-
ceived flaw in federal analysis is not a principled basis for departing from 
the federal standard. Indeed, interpreting the state provision differently 
simply because the court believes the federal analysis to be flawed is not an 
interpretive framework at all. It is reactive and result-oriented, and is irrele-
vant to a determination of the framers’ intent.  
 As explained in Justice Durrant’s concurring opinion in American 
Bush, “a historical analysis of our state constitution is the most appropriate 
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interpretive course to follow when confronted with constitutional ques-
tions.”  American Bush, 2006 UT 40, at ¶ 86 (Durrant, J., concurring). In this 
context, it is the most appropriate method for determining whether Section 
14 provides broader search and seizure protections than the Fourth 
Amendment. This interpretive framework anchors the judicial enterprise 
“to the text of the constitution as understood and intended by its framers 
and the voters who ratified it” and “provides stability to state government 
while remaining true to the principle that it is the people of this state who 
should ultimately determine how our society should be structured.”  Id. at 
¶¶ 83-84; accord Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure 
Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. 
Rev. 751, 774-80 (1993) [hereinafter “The Utah Example”] (endorsing “histori-
cally-based” approach that incorporates neutral principles). 
B. Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution was generally in-
tended to provide the same protections afforded under the 
Fourth Amendment.  
 An examination of the text, background, and history of article I, sec-
tion 14 reveals that its framers, and the people who ratified it, generally in-
tended to guarantee the same protections afforded under the Fourth 
Amendment.  
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1. The text of Section 14 is the surest indication that the pro-
tections afforded thereunder were intended to mirror 
those of the Fourth Amendment. 
 The language of Section 14 “contains the surest indication of the in-
tent of its framers and the citizens of Utah who voted it into effect.” Ameri-
can Bush, 2006 UT 40, ¶16. In all relevant respects, Section 14 is identical to 
the Fourth Amendment. It differs only in punctuation, capitalization, and 
the omission of the unnecessary “and” that precedes “particularly” in the 
Fourth Amendment: 
Fourth Amendment (differences identified with editing marks) 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to 
be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Utah Const. art. I, § 14.   
 Nothing in the text of Section 14 indicates any enlargement or expan-
sion of rights beyond those afforded under the Fourth Amendment. Like the 
Fourth Amendment, Section 14 secures the right of the people “against un-
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reasonable searches and seizures,” and like the Fourth Amendment, it re-
quires that warrants be based “upon probable cause,” be “supported by 
oath or affirmation,” and “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched[,] 
and the person(s) or thing(s) to be seized.” Id. As further explained below, 
this identity of language is strongly indicative of the framers’ intent to pro-
vide protections identical to those of the Fourth Amendment.  
2. The evolution of Utah’s search and seizure provision sug-
gests that Utah’s framers intended to provide protections 
that mirrored the Fourth Amendment. 
 The evolution of Utah’s search and seizure provision also suggests 
that the framers intended to provide Utah citizens with the same protec-
tions as those afforded under the Fourth Amendment.  The constitutional 
convention of 1895 represented the territory’s sixth attempt at statehood.  
See Linda Thatcher, A Chronology of Utah Statehood, Beehive History 21, at 28-
32 (1995). The search and seizure provision of the territory’s six proposed 
constitutions evolved from a version unlike the Fourth Amendment to a 
version that, as discussed, is materially identical to the Fourth Amendment: 
 1849 Draft.  The people shall be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and possessions, from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.3  
                                              
3 1849 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, Art. VIII, sec. 6, re-
produced in Laws of Utah 44, 55 (1855) [hereinafter “1849 Draft Const., art. 
VIII, § 6”]. 
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 1862 Draft.  The people shall be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and possessions, from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.4  
 1872 Draft.  The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable sei-
zures and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place or places to be searched, and 
the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized.5  
 1882 Draft.  The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, 
and the person or persons, and thing or things, to be seized.6 
 1887 Draft.  The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.7 
                                              
4 1862 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, Art. II, sec. 5, as re-
ported in THE DESERET NEWS, Jan. 29, 1862, at 242 [hereinafter “1862 Draft 
Const., art. II, § 5.”]. 
5 1872 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, art. I, sec. 18, as re-
ported in THE DESERET NEWS, Mar. 6, 1872, at 53 [hereinafter “1872 Draft 
Const., art. I, § 18”]. 
6 1882 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, art. I, sec. 16, as re-
ported in Constitution of the State of Utah: Adopted by the Convention, 
April 27, 1882 [hereinafter “1882 Draft Const., art. I, § 16”]. 
7 1887 Draft Constitution of the State of Utah, art. I, sec. 19, as report-
ed in THE DESERET NEWS, Jul. 13, 1887, at 412 [hereinafter “1887 Draft 
Const., art. I, § 19”]. 
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 1895.  The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the person or 
thing to be seized.8 
 The 1849 and 1862 drafts were identical, and included only a reason-
ableness clause. They did not include a warrant clause, as found in the 
Fourth Amendment and almost all state constitutions of the time.  See State-
by-State Comparison Chart [hereinafter “CC”] (Addendum B). And rather 
than tracking the reasonableness language of the Fourth Amendment, the 
1849/1862 version tracked the language found in the Delaware, Pennsylva-
nia, and Connecticut constitutions (using active voice and referring to “pos-
sessions” rather than “effects”). See CC, B1-2.9   
 Subsequent drafts adopted the format of the Fourth Amendment, in-
corporating both a reasonableness clause and a warrant clause.  These ver-
sions also abandoned the active voice/ “possessions” language of Delaware, 
Pennsylvania, and Connecticut, in favor of Fourth Amendment phraseolo-
                                              
8 Utah Const. art. I, sec. 14; 2 Proceedings at 1856. 
9 The constitutions of Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hamp-
shire, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Maine, Michigan, and 
Texas also substantially tracked the reasonableness clause language of Del-
aware, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut.  See CC, at B2-7.  The Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Ohio constitutions referred to “possessions” rather than “ef-
fects,” but used the passive “shall not be violated” language.  See CC, at B4-
5. 
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gy.  While similar to the Fourth Amendment, the 1872 version appears to 
have “simply incorporated Nevada’s search and seizure guarantee.”  Paul 
G. Cassell, Search and Seizure and the Utah Constitution: The Irrelevance of the 
Antipolygamy Raids, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 1, 3 (1995) [hereinafter “Antipolygamy 
Raids”]. “More than 120 copies of the Nevada Constitution were printed and 
distributed to the delegates” at the convention. Id. The Utah delegates 
thereafter adopted a search and seizure provision that, but for some differ-
ences in capitalization, was identical to that found in the Nevada Constitu-
tion, with its somewhat unique and awkward language.10  It thus secured 
the right against unreasonable “seizures and searches” and provided that 
warrants may not issue “but on probable cause, . . . particularly describing 
the place or places to be searched, and the person or persons, and thing or things to 
be seized.”  1872 Draft Const., art. I, sec. 18 (emphasized language denoting 
differences from Fourth Amendment); CC, at B9.   
 The 1882 version abandoned the “seizures and searches” language of 
the Nevada model, adopting instead the “searches and seizures” language 
of the Fourth Amendment. See 1882 Draft Const., art. I, § 16. Other than 
some punctuation differences, it made no other changes to the Nevada 
                                              
10 Utah’s version only differed in that unlike the Nevada provision, it 
did not capitalize “oath” or “affirmation.”  See CC, at B9. 
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model. The 1887 version moved further away from the Nevada model, dis-
carding the awkward warrant clause language. See CC, at B9.  The 1887 ver-
sion instead tracked the language of the Fourth Amendment, requiring that 
warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.” 1887 Draft Const., art. I, § 19; U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
 The final and current search and seizure provision, adopted at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1895, represented a final repudiation of the 
Nevada model, replacing “on probable cause” with the Fourth Amendment 
language, “upon probable cause.” Id. As explained above, the 1895 version 
is materially identical to the Fourth Amendment, making only minor stylis-
tic changes to the Fourth Amendment language.   
 The framers chose to mirror the language of the Fourth Amendment, 
even though they had a variety of other models to choose from. They might 
have chosen to pattern the search and seizure guarantee after the more 
broadly worded Washington provision, which stated that “[n]o person shall 
be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority 
of law.” Wash. Const. art. I, § 7 (Oct. 1, 1889); see also The Utah Example, su-
pra, at 751, 801 & n.312. They might have specified that the probable cause 
showing be made in writing or by affidavit, as required under the constitu-
tions of Rhode Island, Illinois, Missouri, Colorado, South Dakota, Montana, 
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Idaho, and Wyoming. See CC, at B4, B6, B9-10. They might have chosen to 
adopt the language used by some of the original thirteen states. See CC, at 
B1-4. Or, they might have added to the wording of the Fourth Amendment, 
as did Nevada and other states. See, generally, CC, at B4-9.  Instead, they ad-
hered to the language of the Fourth Amendment. 
 In sum, the evolution of Utah’s search and seizure provision—from a 
single reasonableness clause (fashioned in the language of our first two 
states), to the Nevada model (with its unique wording), to the near replica 
of the Fourth Amendment—suggests that Utah’s framers were satisfied 
with the protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment and intended 
to secure for Utahns those same protections. Indeed, given the evolving his-
tory of Utah’s provision, which culminated in the adoption of a provision 
mirroring the Fourth Amendment, “it is difficult to argue that the Utah pro-
vision should be more broadly interpreted.” Antipolygamy Raids, supra, at 5. 
3. The action taken by Utah’s framers at the 1895 Conven-
tion, together with their debates and statements, suggest 
that they intended to provide protections that mirrored 
the Fourth Amendment. 
 The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1895 also offer 
important clues regarding the framers’ intent. On the fifteenth day of the 
Convention, Heber M. Wells submitted the report of the Committee on the 
Preamble and Declaration of Rights (“Rights Committee”). 1 Official Report 
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of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Salt Lake City on 
the Fourth Day of March, 1895, to Adopt a Constitution for the State of Utah 200 
(Salt Lake City, Star Printing Co. 1898) [hereinafter “Proceedings”]. Two days 
later, the Convention began its consideration of the proposed declaration of 
rights. Proceedings, at 228-29. On the twenty-second day, “Section 14 was 
read and passed without amendment” or discussion. Id. at 319.  
 Although the delegates were silent regarding Section 14, the actions 
taken by the delegates, and their statements and debates, offer significant 
insight into their intent as to Section 14. Of most significance was a written 
address to the people of Utah recommending ratification, which declared 
that “[t]he inspiration behind the declaration of rights came from the great 
parent bill of rights framed by the fathers of our country.” 2 Proceedings 
1847. The framers thus viewed the Bill of Rights as the starting point, or 
foundation, upon which the declaration of rights was built. That said, they 
also understood that they were not obligated to provide protections identi-
cal to the Bill of Rights. Thus, Dennis Clay Eichnor, a member of the Rights 
Committee, stated that he “consulted [all] forty-four state constitutions, in 
preparing [the] declaration of rights.  Id. at 102.   
 An examination of the declaration of rights, as adopted by the Con-
vention, reveals that the framers generally retained the fundamental guar-
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antees of the Bill of Rights. In many instances they borrowed liberally from 
other state constitutions to clarify, supplement, or otherwise modify the 
federal right.11 In other words, they built upon the foundation of the “great 
                                              
11 See, e.g. Utah Const. art. I, § 1 (adding that all men have the right “to 
worship according to the dictates of their consciences” and “to communi-
cate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of 
that right”); Utah Const. art. I, § 4 (incorporating First Amendment religious 
liberty clauses but adding that “[t]he rights of conscience shall never be in-
fringed,” that “[t]here shall be no union of church and State,” that participa-
tion in elections and juries may not be conditioned on religious beliefs, and 
that money may not be appropriated for religious functions or establish-
ments); Utah Const. art. I, § 6 (specifying that the people’s right to bear arms 
is “for their security and defense”); Utah Const. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting “un-
necessary rigor” of prisoners in addition to prohibiting excessive bails and 
fines, and cruel and unusual punishment, as found in the Eighth Amend-
ment); Utah Const. art. I, § 10 (expounding on the right to a jury trial); Utah 
Const. art. I, § 12 (adding the right to have “a copy” of the accusation, “the 
right to appear and defend in person,” the right “to testify in [one’s] own 
behalf,” and “the right to appeal in all cases,” providing that “the accused, 
before final judgment, [could not] be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure the[se] rights,” and adding that “a wife shall not be compelled to tes-
tify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife”); Utah Const. art. 
I, § 13 (permitting initiation of criminal prosecution by grand jury indict-
ment or, unlike Fifth Amendment, “by information after an examination 
and commitment by a magistrate”); Utah Const. art. I, § 15 (adding that 
freedom of speech and of the press may not be restrained and setting the 
parameters for defamation law); Utah Const. art. I, § 19 (defining treason 
using the same terminology as U.S. Const., art. III, § 3, but unlike art. III, § 3, 
not recognizing that a conviction for treason can be based on the traitor’s 
confession in open court); Utah Const. art. I, § 20 (providing the same rights 
of the Third Amendment regarding the quartering of soldiers, but adding a 
provision that “[t]he military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power”); Utah Const. art. I, § 22 (prohibiting the taking of private property 
for public use without just compensation, as in the Fifth Amendment, but 
adding that private property may not be “damaged for public use without 
just compensation”). 
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parent bill of rights.” 2 Proceedings 1847. In other instances, however, the 
language of other federal provisions was left unaltered (save for stylistic 
changes). As discussed, the framers left unaltered the language of the 
Fourth Amendment in Section 14.  Compare U.S. Const. amend. IV with Utah 
Const. art. I, § 14. They also left unaltered the language of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, prohibiting slavery, in Section 21. Compare U.S. Const. amend. 
XIII with Utah Const. art. I, § 21.  Section 5, governing the privilege of the 
writ of habeas corpus, also tracks the language of its federal counterpart, ar-
ticle I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. Compare U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 with Utah Const. art. I, § 5. Although the delegates 
were silent as to Section 14, sections 5 and 21 generated debate.   
 The debates respecting these latter two provisions are particularly in-
structive when assessing the framers’ intent in choosing language that 
tracked the language of the United States Constitution. 
 Section 21 (proposed as section 22) was proposed by the Rights 
Committee to read:  
 Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist in this State. 
1 Proceedings 326. As noted, this tracked the language of the Thirteenth 
Amendment: 
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 Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for  crime whereof the party shall have been undu-
ly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction. 
U.S. Const. amend. XIII. Orson Whitney moved to amend the proposed 
provision, so “that the word ‘whereof’ be stricken out and the words, ‘of 
which’ be substituted.” 1 Proceedings 326. This proposal to amend was swift-
ly opposed: 
Mr. EICHNOR.   I think that this is the language of the Consti-
tution of the United States. 
Mr. WELLS:  Exactly. 
Mr. EICHNOR: I believe in adhering to the Constitution of the 
United States when we copy it. 
Mr. WHITNEY: It is a hundred years old. 
1 Proceedings 326. Following this discussion, the question was taken on the 
motion and “the amendment was rejected.” 1 Proceedings 326.   
 The debate regarding Section 5 reveals why the delegates believed in 
adhering to federal constitutional language. Unlike Section 21, Section 5 was 
originally proposed in language that differed from the United States Consti-
tution: 
 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, when in case of rebellion or invasion, the 
public safety imperatively demands it. 
-28- 
1 Proceedings 252 (emphasis denoting difference from U.S Const. art. I, § 9). 
On objection of one of the delegates, the word “imperative” was stricken, as 
it was not found in any of the other constitutions. 1 Proceedings 252. Another 
delegate proposed that the provision be amended “by adding ‘in such a 
manner as shall be prescribed by law.’” 1 Proceedings 252-53. But Charles 
Varian opposed the amendment, asking why it “cannot . . . be safely left to 
such occasions and to be exercised in accordance with the general precedent 
and history of its exercise in this country.” 1 Proceedings 252-53. Others op-
posed the amendment on grounds that both the United States Constitution 
and most state constitutions did not include such language.  See 1 Proceed-
ings 253-57. The proposed amendment was thus rejected. Delegate Evans 
from Weber County then proposed that the words “demands it” be replaced 
with the words, “requires it,” as provided in the United States Constitution: 
I just want to say that is the exact language of the Constitution 
of the United States and [“demands it”] might be considered in 
a different way.  The words, ‘requires it’ have a well under-
stood meaning by the construction of the courts.  Now it may 
be considered differently if we use the words ‘demands it,’ be-
cause it might be that there should be some demand made up-
on the authorities whenever the public safety requires it.  For 
that reason, I think it would be better to use the usual language. 
1 Proceedings 257. The question was thereafter taken upon the motion and 
the amendment was adopted by the Convention, resulting in a provision 
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that tracked the language of the United States Constitution. 1 Proceedings 
257. 
 These debates thus reveal that when the framers copied language 
from the United States Constitution, they did so to ensure that the provision 
would not “be considered in a different way.” 1 Proceedings 257. When using 
language from the United States Constitution, or other constitutions, they 
did not seek to recognize rights that might be interpreted differently, but 
rather to guarantee rights that were firmly established by the courts. They 
sought stability and uniformity. 
 Another such example was the debate regarding the right of the ac-
cused “to be confronted by the witnesses against him.” Utah Const. art. I, § 
12. Mr. Van Horne proposed an exception to the confrontation right, where 
“evidence by deposition may be authorized by law.” 1 Proceedings 306. This 
proposed amendment was met with fierce opposition on the grounds that it 
represented a departure from established precedent. In opposing the 
amendment, Charles Varian remarked that it “proposed to interpolate 
something new here involving something that puts us all at sea; again, re-
quiring, as of necessity it will, other judicial construction, and interpretation 
. . . .” 1 Proceedings 307. Concluding his remarks, Mr. Varian then asked:  
Why not leave it as it is?  Why not leave it within the ancient 
landmarks, so that every lawyer and every layman may know just 
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what this does mean? Judicial decision after decision, all in one line, 
particularly have determined the meaning of this language as 
the committee have reported it here. Why should we stray away 
and put something in there that will tend to bring about and will 
doubtless bring about this confusion and conflict in interpretation? 
1 Proceedings 307-08 (emphasis added). The proposed amendment was 
thereafter rejected. 1 Proceedings 308. Once again, the framers rejected lan-
guage that would inject uncertainty in the right provided, in favor of lan-
guage whose meaning was well established. 
 As noted, the framers did not engage in any such discussions regard-
ing Section 14. But as discussed, they set as their inspiration the Bill of 
Rights and did not depart from the language of that charter in drafting Sec-
tion 14. Absent evidence to the contrary, therefore, this Court should pre-
sume that the Constitution’s framers, and the people who ratified it, intend-
ed that the protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment and Section 
14 “be one and the same.” Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221.  
C. Warrantless searches of vehicles based on probable cause 
alone have been recognized as reasonable since the inception 
of the nation. 
 In light of the foregoing presumption, this Court should depart from 
Fourth Amendment precedent only “in compelling circumstances,” Ander-
son, 910 P.2d at 1235 (plurality opinion), e.g., relevant case law or other his-
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torical evidence at or near the time of the framing suggesting a different 
understanding.  
 Defendant asks the Court to adopt a different interpretation based on 
inconsistencies, vagaries, or changes in federal jurisprudence. Pet.Brf. 6-8. 
But as explained by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Anderson, 
“Utah ought not depart from federal search and seizure law in construing 
article I, section 14 simply because of some inconsistency in that law.” 910 
P.2d at 1239 (Stewart, J., concurring in result). But even if such were a valid 
basis to depart from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, no such incon-
sistency or change exists here. Indeed, all the evidence of the law of search 
and seizure supports the court of appeals’ conclusion that a warrantless 
search of a mobile vehicle is supported by probable cause alone. 
 The “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant re-
quirement was first recognized in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 
(1925)—a decision that issued just 30 years after the Utah Constitution’s 
adoption. Carroll held that “the true rule is that if a search and seizure with-
out a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasona-
bly arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an auto-
mobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and 
destruction, the search and seizure are valid.” Id. at 149.  
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 In support, Carroll relied on a case that predated the Utah Constitu-
tion’s adoption by almost 10 years—Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 
(1886)—which recognized the difference between seizing evidence of crimi-
nality and contraband. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149-50. But more importantly for 
purposes here, Carroll looked to the actions of the First Congress as persua-
sive evidence of what the Framers who adopted the Bill of Rights under-
stood the Constitution to mean. In this vein, the Act of 1789 authorized, on 
appropriate suspicion, the search and seizure of goods in transit without a 
warrant:  
“That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other per-
son specially appointed by either of them for that purpose, 
shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in 
which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or 
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to 
search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or mer-
chandise ....” 
Id. at 150 (quoting 1 Stat. 43) (emphasis added). But the Act did not author-
ize the warrantless search and seizure of such goods in homes or buildings: 
“[A]nd if [such a collector, naval officer, surveyor, or other spe-
cially appointed person] shall have cause to suspect a conceal-
ment thereof, in any particular dwelling, house, store, building, or 
other place, they or either of them shall, upon application on oath 
or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to 
enter such house, store, or other place (in the daytime only) and 
there to search for such goods, and if any shall be found, to 
seize and secure the same for trial ....” 
Id. at 150-51 (quoting 1 Stat. 43) (emphasis added).  
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 Drawing from the Act of 1789 and ensuing legislation, Carroll con-
cluded “that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the 
beginning of the government, as recognizing a necessary difference between 
a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a 
proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a search of a ship, mo-
tor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practi-
cable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of 
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” Id. at 153. 
And turning to the circumstances when a warrantless search of a vehicle 
may be made, Carroll held that “those lawfully within the country, entitled 
to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interrup-
tion or search unless there is known to a competent official, authorized to 
search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contra-
band or illegal merchandise.” Id. at 154. 
 In sum, Carroll held that due to the mobility of a vehicle, a warrantless 
search of a vehicle that is stopped on the roadway is reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment if there is probable cause to believe it contains contra-
band. The Supreme Court has never strayed from that principle.  
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 In Cooper v. California, the Court held that “searches of cars that are 
constantly movable may make the search of a car without a warrant a rea-
sonable one although the result might be the opposite in a search of a home, 
a store, or other fixed piece of property.” 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967). In Chambers 
v. Maroney, the Court again recognized that “[i]n terms of circumstances jus-
tifying a warrantless search, the Court has long distinguished between an 
automobile and a home or office.” 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970). Chambers thus reit-
erated that a warrant is unnecessary for the search of a vehicle because “the 
car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never 
be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” Id. at 51. In Cardwell v. Lewis, 
the Court recognized that the underlying factor for the automobile excep-
tion “has been the exigent circumstances that exist in connection with mov-
able vehicles,” i.e., “the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readi-
ly movable.’ ” 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974) (quoting Chambers, 399 U.S. at 50-51). 
In United States v. Ross, the Court reiterated Carroll’s conclusion that war-
rantless vehicle searches based on probable cause are reasonable “[g]iven 
the nature of an automobile in transit.” 456 U.S. 798, 806-07 (1982). And in 
California v. Carney, the Court again observed that its cases “have consistent-
ly recognized ready mobility as one of the principal bases of the automobile 
exception.” 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). 
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 Notwithstanding these clear pronouncements, some lower courts be-
gan to read the Supreme Court’s cases as requiring additional exigency, 
apart from an automobile’s mobility. But in two per curiam decisions, the 
Supreme Court reiterated that it has never required exigency beyond the 
ready mobility of a vehicle. In Pennsylvania v. Labron, the Court held that 
lower court decisions holding otherwise were based “on an incorrect read-
ing of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant re-
quirement.” 518 U.S. 938, 938-39 (1996) (per curiam). Labron emphasized 
that the automobile exception has from its inception been “based on the au-
tomobile’s ready mobility,’ an exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain 
a search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear.” Id. at 
940. And three years later in Maryland v. Dyson, the Court again held that 
“under [its] established precedent” since Carroll, “the ‘automobile excep-
tion’ has no separate exigency requirement.” 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999) (per 
curiam).12  
                                              
12 Some cases have recognized that warrantless automobile searches 
based on probable cause are also justified “ ‘because the expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating 
to one’s home or office.’ ” California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985) (cita-
tion omitted). But that fact does not detract from the original reason identi-
fied by the Court for upholding warrantless automobile searches. 
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 The plurality in Anderson saw it no differently, holding that “exigent 
circumstances exist when ‘the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and 
the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be ob-
tained.’ ” 910 P.2d at 1237 (plurality opinion) (quoting Chambers, 399 U.S. at 
51).  
 Defendant argues that the ability of officers to apply for a warrant 
electronically changes the calculus. Pet.Brf. 9-10. Not so. Seizing a car to 
await a warrant requires the same probable cause and exigency required to 
search the car. As explained in Chambers, there is “no constitutional differ-
ence between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting 
the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out 
an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, ei-
ther course is reasonable.” 399 U.S. at 51-52. The Court in Ross explained 
that permitting either course of action is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—“based on the practicalities of the situations presented and a 
realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protection that a contrary rule 
would provide for privacy interests.” 456 U.S. at 807 n.9. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
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 Respectfully submitted on January 9, 2017. 
 SEAN D. REYES 
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JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE 
GREGORY K. ORME and SENIOR JUDGE JAMES Z. DAVIS concurred. 1 
ROTH, Judge: 
¶1 Zachary Rigby appeals his conviction for driving with a 
measurable controlled substance in the body and possession or 
use of a controlled substance, both class B misdemeanors. Rigby 
challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence that the police found during a warrantless search of his 
vehicle. Rigby contends that the Utah Constitution provides its 
                                                                                                                    
1. Senior Judge James Z. Davis began his work on this case as a 
member of the Utah Court of Appeals. He retired from the court, 
but thereafter became a Senior Judge. He completed his work on 
this case sitting by special assignment as authorized by law. See 
generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6). 
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citizens greater protection against unreasonable searches than 
the United States Constitution because Utah courts have 
required police officers to have both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances when performing a warrantless search under the 
automobile exception. He concedes the officers had probable 
cause to search his automobile following the traffic stop but 
asserts that they violated his constitutional rights by conducting 
the search without a warrant in the absence of exigent 
circumstances. Because we are reluctant to diverge from our 
supreme court’s historical pattern of paralleling federal search 
and seizure law, we conclude that law enforcement officers were 
only required to have probable cause to justify the search of 
Rigby’s vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement. Accordingly, we affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
¶2 Ordinarily, ‚*w+e recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to the trial court’s findings from the suppression 
hearing.‛ State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. 
Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). But for purposes 
of Rigby’s motion to suppress and, by extension, this appeal, 
both parties have stipulated to the facts as presented in the 
original police report. ‚A stipulation of fact filed with and 
accepted by a court . . . is conclusive of all matters necessarily 
included in the stipulation.‛ Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah 
State Tax Comm’n, 2001 UT 11, ¶ 20, 20 P.3d 287 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Prinsburg State Bank v. 
Abundo, 2012 UT 94, ¶ 14, 296 P.3d 709 (‚*W]hen a court adopts a 
stipulation of the parties, the issues to which the parties have 
stipulated become settled . . . .‛ (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Therefore, we recite the facts in accordance 
with the parties’ stipulation. 
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¶3 On March 28, 2013, a police officer pulled Rigby’s 
automobile over for a stop sign violation. Upon approaching the 
vehicle, the police officer could ‚*i+immediately . . . detect[] the 
odor of both burnt and fresh marijuana coming from the 
vehicle.‛ Rigby and the two other occupants were ‚exhibiting 
physical indicators of recent marijuana use, including bloodshot 
eyes, droopy eyelids and a stoned look,‛ along with acting 
‚extremely nervous‛ during the traffic stop. Additional officers, 
including a K9 officer, were called to the location. The officer 
who initiated the traffic stop then ‚explained *to Rigby+ that *he+ 
was going to be searching the vehicle, not only based on the fact 
that [he] could smell the marijuana in the vehicle but because the 
drug dog had given a positive indication as well.‛ Two officers 
then searched Rigby’s vehicle; they recovered a small metal pipe 
with marijuana residue and plastic bags containing fresh 
marijuana. Rigby was arrested and charged with possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; driving with a 
measurable controlled substance in the body and possession or 
use of a controlled substance, both class B misdemeanors; and 
failure to stop at a stop sign, a class C misdemeanor. 
¶4 Rigby filed a motion to suppress ‚*a+ll evidence seized 
and any statement obtained‛ ‚as a result of the unlawful 
searches‛ conducted ‚in violation of the Utah Constitution.‛ At 
the evidentiary hearing on Rigby’s motion, he conceded that the 
‚odor of marijuana was sufficient‛ to establish probable cause 
but argued that exigent circumstances were also ‚required in 
order to justify a warrantless search‛ under the automobile 
exception. The trial court denied Rigby’s motion to suppress, 
finding that ‚the search was reasonable under the circumstances 
and such evidence was lawfully obtained under the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement.‛ 
¶5 Rigby subsequently pled guilty to one count of driving 
with a measurable controlled substance in the body, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6a-517(2) (LexisNexis 2014), and one count of 
possession or use of a controlled substance, see id. § 58-37-
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8(2)(a)(i).2 In entering his pleas, Rigby reserved the right to 
appeal the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion. See State 
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (describing how a 
conditional plea ‚specifically preserves the suppression issue for 
appeal and allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant’s 
arguments in favor of suppression are accepted by the appellate 
court‛) (citations omitted). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶6 On appeal, Rigby argues that although the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution contain nearly 
identically phrased protections against unreasonable searches, 
the Utah Constitution provides greater protection to its citizens 
by requiring law enforcement officers to have both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances before conducting a warrantless 
search under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement, even though the United States Supreme Court has 
held that under the federal constitution the automobile exception 
requires only probable cause. ‚Matters of constitutional 
interpretation are questions of law that we review for 
correctness, and we provide no deference to the district court’s 
legal conclusions.‛ State v. Gonzalez-Camargo, 2012 UT App 366, 
¶ 15, 293 P.3d 1121 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ¶ 27, 344 P.3d 581 
(‛Constitutional issues . . . are questions of law that we review 
for correctness . . . .‛ (first omission in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
                                                                                                                    
2. Because the statutory provisions in effect at the relevant times 
do not differ materially from the statutory provisions now in 
effect, we cite the current version of the Utah Code for 
convenience.  
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ANALYSIS 
¶7 Both the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution contain nearly identical provisions safeguarding an 
individual’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures.3 
Both protect ‚*t+he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures‛ by the government. U.S. Const. amend. 
IV; see also Utah Const. art. I, § 14. Some time ago, the Utah 
Supreme Court observed that ‚Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution reads nearly verbatim with the fourth amendment, 
and thus [the] Court has never drawn any distinctions between 
the protections afforded by the respective constitutional 
provisions. Rather, the Court has always considered the 
protections afforded to be one and the same.‛ State v. Watts, 750 
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988). The question presented here is 
whether Utah courts should continue to follow this principle and 
track the relatively recent evolution of the automobile exception 
under federal law or chart its own path under the Utah 
Constitution. To address this question, we first trace the history 
of the automobile exception under both federal and state case 
law. Next we examine the status of the automobile exception 
under federal law in light of the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per 
curiam). Finally, we consider whether Utah is likely to continue 
to track federal law after Labron with regard to the automobile 
exception or chart a new path under the Utah Constitution. 
                                                                                                                    
3. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
(continued<) 
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I. The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
¶8 Because warrantless searches are ‚per se unreasonable,‛ 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967), ‚*p]olice officers 
generally need a warrant to search a place in which a person has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy,‛ State v. Boyles, 2015 UT 
App 185, ¶ 10, 356 P.3d 687 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 
154, 164 (1978)); see also id. (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 164) (noting 
that ‚*b+efore issuing a search warrant, a magistrate must 
determine that probable cause exists to conduct the search‛). 
‚There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule . . . one [of 
which] is the so-called ‘automobile exception’ . . . .‛ California v. 
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). Historically, under the 
automobile exception, police were permitted to search an 
automobile without a warrant so long as both probable cause 
and exigent circumstances existed. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 U.S. 42, 48–51 (1970); State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 
1978). 
                                                                                                                    
(<continued) 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Utah Constitution is phrased very 
similarly: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
 
Utah Const. art. I, § 14. 
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A.   The Automobile Exception Under Federal Case Law 
¶9 In 1925, the United States Supreme Court decided Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the seminal case addressing 
the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement. In Carroll, the Court determined that while an 
individual has a constitutionally protected privacy interest in an 
automobile, the degree of protection is lessened ‚because the 
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in 
which the warrant must be sought.‛ Id. at 153. This mobility 
principle has continued to be a factor in the Supreme Court’s 
approach to automobile search cases since Carroll. See, e.g., 
Labron, 518 U.S. at 940; New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112–13 
(1986); Carney, 471 U.S. at 392–93; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364, 367 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588–89 (1974); 
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441–42 (1973); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 459–60 (1971); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52; 
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967).  
¶10 The Court has recognized, however, that ‚ready mobility 
is not the only basis for the *automobile+ exception.‛ Carney, 471 
U.S. at 391. Rather, the exception is also justified because of the 
‚reduced expectations of privacy‛ arising from the ‚pervasive 
regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public 
highways.‛ Id. at 392 (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 440–41); see also 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009) (recognizing that ‚a 
motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than 
in his home‛); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303–07 (1999) 
(holding that both drivers and passengers have a reduced 
expectation of privacy in an automobile); Class, 475 U.S. at 113 
(‚*A+utomobiles are justifiably the subject of pervasive 
regulation by the State.‛); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 
12–13 (1977) (‚One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor 
vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom 
serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal 
effects.‛) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590. 
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¶11 Historically, the automobile exception has required two 
circumstances. First, there must be probable cause for a search. 
See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 48 (‚*A+utomobiles . . . may be searched 
without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify the 
search without a warrant of a house or an office, provided that 
there is probable cause . . . .‛). And second, there must be exigent 
circumstances. See id. at 50–51 (‚But the circumstances that 
furnish probable cause to search a particular auto for particular 
articles are most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity 
to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable. . . . Only in 
exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to 
probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search.‛). 
The required exigency was usually found to inhere in a factor 
fundamental to the exception itself, i.e., the characteristic 
mobility of an automobile. See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569 
(citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158–59) (stating that ‚a warrantless 
search of an automobile, based upon probable cause to believe 
that the vehicle contained evidence of crime in light of an 
exigency arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle, 
[does] not contravene the Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment‛). 
¶12 In 1996, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
warrantless search of an automobile no longer required separate 
consideration of exigent circumstances, so long as there was 
probable cause for the search. Labron, 518 U.S. at 940. The Court 
held that ‚ready mobility [was] exigency sufficient to excuse 
failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct 
the search is clear.‛ Id. (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 390–91). In 
reaching this conclusion the Court reasoned that in addition to 
the mobility principle, its prior recognition of the ‚reduced 
expectation of privacy in an automobile‛ justified recasting the 
description of the automobile exception to permit a warrantless 
search ‚*i+f a car is readily mobile and probable cause 
exists . . . without *anything+ more.‛ Id. (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 
393). 
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B.   The Automobile Exception Under Utah Case Law 
¶13 Historically, Utah case law has mirrored federal case law 
with respect to the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement. Utah cases, like their federal counterparts, have 
recognized that ‚*w+arrantless searches are per se unreasonable 
unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement.‛ State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 
1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Our 
case law has also echoed federal case law in recognizing that 
‚*t+here are . . . several exceptions to the warrant requirement . . . 
includ[ing] . . . [the] search of an automobile based on probable 
cause.‛ State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (citing 
Chambers, 399 U.S. 42); see also State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144–45 
(Utah 1978) (discussing the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement and quoting Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51, with 
approval). 
¶14 Our cases have also described the rationale for the 
automobile exception much like federal cases have. For example, 
in the 1948 case City of Price v. Jaynes, while discussing the 
validity of a city ordinance modeled after the Fourth 
Amendment, our supreme court recognized that under federal 
law an individual has a lessened degree of protection in some 
instances based on whether the place to be searched is mobile. 
191 P.2d 606, 608 (Utah 1948). And in City of Price the Utah 
Supreme Court enunciated and followed the principles first 
announced in Carroll: 
[The Fourth Amendment] has been construed 
practically since the beginning of the Government, 
as recognizing a necessary difference between a 
search of a store, dwelling house or other structure 
in respect of which a proper official warrant 
readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, 
motor boat, wagon or automobile for contraband 
goods where it is not practicable to serve a warrant 
State v. Rigby 
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because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of 
the jurisdiction in which the warrant is sought. 
Id. at 608 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153); see also State v. Dorsey, 
731 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1986) (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, (‚It 
has long been held that warrantless vehicle searches are not 
invalid under the Fourth Amendment if probable cause for a 
search exists.‛)). And subsequent to City of Price, the court has 
repeatedly referred to the mobility principle as justification for 
the automobile exception. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, 
¶ 11, 229 P.3d 650; State v. James, 2000 UT 80, ¶ 10, 13 P.3d 576; 
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1234–37 (Utah 1996) (plurality 
opinion); Limb, 581 P.2d at 144–45; State v. Farnsworth, 519 P.2d 
244, 247 (Utah 1974); State v. Shields, 503 P.2d 848, 849 (Utah 
1972). 
¶15 Further, like the federal courts, our supreme court has 
recognized that in addition to an automobile’s ready mobility, 
the automobile exception finds support in reduced privacy 
expectations. For instance, in State v. Baker, the Utah Supreme 
Court noted that the ‚automobile exception to the warrant rule 
arises because occupants of a vehicle have a lesser expectation of 
privacy due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly 
regulated status.‛ 2010 UT 18, ¶ 11 (alteration, citation, and 
internal quotation marks omitted); accord James, 2000 UT 80, ¶ 10 
(‚Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated 
status, persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of 
privacy than they would have within a private dwelling.‛); see 
also State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131–34 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). 
¶16 And like the federal courts until Labron, the Utah Supreme 
Court has historically described the automobile exception as 
requiring both probable cause and exigent circumstances to 
justify a police officer in the warrantless search of an automobile. 
See, e.g., State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984) (‚For 
[the automobile] exception to apply, the police must have 
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probable cause to believe that the automobile contains either 
contraband or evidence of a crime and that they may be lost if 
not immediately seized.‛); see also State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 
470 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (approving the logic of 
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, and re-iterating the requirement that 
police officers have both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances to justify a search under the automobile 
exception); Limb, 581 P.2d at 144 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, with 
approval and holding that probable cause and exigent 
circumstances existed to justify a warrantless search of an 
automobile). Also in line with the federal approach, the Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized that the required exigency 
generally arises from the inherent mobility of an automobile. See 
Shields, 503 P.2d at 849 (‚In exigent circumstances, the judgment 
of a police officer as to probable cause will serve as sufficient 
authorization for a search, i.e., a search warrant is unnecessary 
where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped 
on the highway, for the car is movable, . . . and the car’s contents 
may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.‛). 
II. The Automobile Exception Under Pennsylvania v. Labron 
¶17 On July 1, 1996, the United States Supreme Court decided 
the companion cases of Pennsylvania v. Kilgore and Pennsylvania 
v. Labron in a consolidated opinion. See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 
518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per curiam). In both cases, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had held that the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution required law enforcement officers to 
obtain a warrant before searching a vehicle unless both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances were present. Id. at 938–39. In 
particular, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that the 
warrantless search of Labron’s vehicle was unjustified because 
although law enforcement officers had probable cause to search 
the trunk of the vehicle for suspected drug activity, there were 
no exigent circumstances justifying the search because ‚the 
police had time to secure a warrant.‛ Id. at 939–40. In a relatively 
short per curiam decision, the Supreme Court concluded that it 
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was incorrect under the Fourth Amendment for courts to require 
law enforcement officers to have both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances for the warrantless search of an automobile. Id. 
The Court began its analysis with a brief review of the history of 
the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception. Id. (first citing 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1985); then citing 
Carroll, 267 U.S. 132). The Court noted that the first cases 
underlying the automobile exception ‚were based on the 
automobile’s ‘ready mobility’‛ because ‚‘ready mobility[]’ *is+ an 
exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant 
once probable cause to conduct the search is clear.‛ Id. But the 
Court explained that ‚*m+ore recent cases provide a further 
justification [for the automobile exception+‛ based on an 
‚individual’s reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile[] 
[because of] . . . its pervasive regulation.‛ Id. (citing Carney, 471 
U.S. at 391–92). The Court concluded, ‚If a car is readily mobile 
and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the 
Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle 
without more.‛ Id. (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 393). The Court has 
subsequently stated that Labron stands for the rule that under 
federal law, ‚the ‘automobile exception’ has no separate 
exigency requirement.‛ Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466–67 
(1999) (per curiam) (discussing Labron, 518 U.S. 938).4 
                                                                                                                    
4. In Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999) (per curiam), the 
Supreme Court stated that it had been ‚clear‛ since United States 
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), that the automobile exception had no 
exigency requirement and characterized Labron as simply 
reiterating that principle: 
The Fourth Amendment generally requires police 
to secure a warrant before conducting a search. 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1985). As 
we recognized nearly 75 years ago in Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), there is an 
exception to this requirement for searches of 
(continued<) 
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III. The Automobile Exception Under Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution 
¶18 The Utah Supreme Court has not specifically considered 
the effect of Labron on Utah law. And though we have 
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vehicles. And under our established precedent, the 
‚automobile exception‛ has no separate exigency 
requirement. We made this clear in United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982), when we said that in 
cases where there was probable cause to search a 
vehicle ‚a search is not unreasonable if based on 
facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, 
even though a warrant has not been actually obtained.‛ 
In a case with virtually identical facts to this one 
(even down to the bag of cocaine in the trunk of the 
car), Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per 
curiam), we repeated that the automobile exception 
does not have a separate exigency requirement: 
‚If a car is readily mobile and probable cause 
exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth 
Amendment . . . permits police to search the 
vehicle without more.‛ Id. at 940. 
Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466–67 (emphasis in original). But Labron itself 
did not mention Ross and seemed at the time to mark a point of 
departure from the exigency requirement. Certainly, the 
conclusion Dyson draws from Ross seems more apparent in 
Labron’s clarifying light than it may have been before then. It is 
tempting to surmise that Labron’s per curiam nature may have 
signaled that the Court did not consider its decision to be so 
much a departure from the past as an acknowledgement that, 
given its foundation in the mobility principle, the exigency 
requirement may already have largely lost its role as an 
independent component of the automobile exception. 
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mentioned Labron on occasion, this court has not had the 
opportunity to specifically analyze Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution in light of that decision. In fact, each of the 
few times this court has cited Labron, we did so to support a 
conclusion—in the context of analyzing federal law—that a law 
enforcement officer’s search of an appellant’s automobile was 
justified under the automobile exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement because the officer had 
probable cause. See State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, ¶¶ 14, 16, 
173 P.3d 213 (recognizing that the requirements to justify a 
search under the automobile exception have ‚fluctuated in the 
past,‛ but ultimately relying on both Dyson and Labron to 
conclude that ‚federal law ha*d+ been clarified‛ and therefore 
‚*t+he officers’ search . . . was justified under the automobile 
exception to the Fourth Amendment[] . . . because the officers 
had probable cause‛); State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, ¶¶ 6–8, 
141 P.3d 602 (relying on Dyson and Labron to conclude that 
because the defendant’s vehicle was mobile the officer needed 
only probable cause to search the vehicle under the Fourth 
Amendment); State v. Mehew, 2003 UT App 166U, para. 3 (citing 
Labron, 518 U.S. at 940) (holding that because the defendant’s 
vehicle was mobile and probable cause existed the warrantless 
search of the vehicle was valid under the automobile exception). 
Further, although not specifically citing Labron, we have applied 
the rule Labron recognized—that the automobile exception, 
under federal law, has no separate exigency requirement—on a 
number of occasions. See, e.g., State v. Juma, 2012 UT App 27, ¶ 9, 
270 P.3d 564; State v. Butler, 2011 UT App 281, ¶ 12, 263 P.3d 463; 
In re D.A.B., 2009 UT App 169, ¶ 7, 214 P.3d 878; State v. Griffith, 
2006 UT App 291, ¶ 6, 141 P.3d 602. And it appears that the only 
time we have been asked to consider whether Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution would yield a more restrictive 
interpretation of the automobile exception than Labron, we 
declined to do so because the state constitutional issues were 
inadequately briefed. See Despain, 2007 UT App 367, ¶ 12 
(explaining that the ‚[d]efendant mentioned both the Utah and 
United States Constitutions in his opening brief,‛ but ‚did not 
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conduct a separate analysis of the protections afforded by each‛ 
and, as a consequence, this court ‚refrained from engaging in *a+ 
state constitutional analysis‛ of the automobile exception and 
affirmed the district court based on Labron’s holding that the 
Fourth Amendment required only probable cause for the 
warrantless search of an automobile). 
¶19 Here, Rigby acknowledges that both ‚the U.S. 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution contain almost identical 
protections against unreasonable searches‛ and that ‚in 1996 the 
U.S. Supreme Court [in Labron] changed the requirements under 
the U.S. Constitution to require probabl*e+ cause only,‛ no 
longer requiring a separate showing of exigency. Rigby argues, 
however, that ‚*n+o such decision has been issued regarding the 
status of the Utah Constitution.‛ And therefore, according to 
Rigby, ‚under the Utah Constitution an officer must still have 
both probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify the 
warrantless search of an automobile.‛ Unlike the appellant in 
Despain, we believe that Rigby analyzes the issue in a manner 
sufficient to warrant our consideration of whether, in light of 
Labron, the Utah Constitution now provides its citizens greater 
protection against unreasonable searches than the United States 
Constitution by continuing to require that police officers have 
both probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify a 
warrantless search under the automobile exception. Rigby 
primarily draws support for his argument that Utah ought to 
depart from the federal path with regard to the automobile 
exception from three opinions, which seem to be the Utah 
Supreme Court’s last ventures into the realm of the Utah 
Constitution’s relationship to the automobile exception prior to 
Labron: State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion), and State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) (plurality opinion). We 
address each case in order to determine whether our supreme 
court has established a discernible distinction between the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution that may apply here. 
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A. State v. Watts 
¶20 In State v. Watts a majority of the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the appellant’s conviction for unlawful production and 
possession of marijuana. Watts, 750 P.2d at 1225. The appellant 
in Watts had unsuccessfully moved the trial court to suppress 
evidence based upon the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Id. at 1220. While ultimately holding that private 
searches did not fall within the protection of the Utah 
Constitution, the Watts court acknowledged and affirmed its 
historical pattern of interpreting both the federal and the state 
constitutions as providing identical protections: 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution reads 
nearly verbatim with the fourth amendment, and 
thus this Court has never drawn any distinctions 
between the protections afforded by the respective 
constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court has 
always considered the protections afforded to be 
one and the same. We do not depart from that view 
in this case, and hold that unreasonable private 
searches are not subject to the protection of article 
I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Id. at 1221 (footnotes omitted).  
¶21 Although Rigby acknowledges the court’s reasoning, he 
points to a footnote in Watts in which the court opined that 
‚choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different 
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for 
insulating this state’s citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal 
courts.‛ Id. at 1221 n.8. Rigby interprets this footnote as 
indicating that ‚*t+he Watts court reserved the right to 
distinguish between the protections afforded by the two 
Constitutions.‛ But the footnote’s indication of the court’s 
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willingness to consider a different direction at some point in the 
future must be considered in light of the majority’s unequivocal 
decision not to ‚depart . . . from *the court’s+ consistent 
refusal . . . to interpret article I, section 14 of [the Utah] 
constitution in a manner different from the fourth amendment to 
the federal constitution.‛ Id. Therefore, the supreme court’s 
statement in Watts reinforces Utah’s historical pattern of tracking 
federal law in this area both in principle and in practice while 
keeping open the possibility of departing from that pattern, 
should the circumstances undergirding it change in some 
significant way. Cf. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 11, 164 P.3d 
397 (‚In cases involving Fourth Amendment questions under the 
United States Constitution, we review mixed questions of law 
and fact under a correctness standard in the interest of creating 
uniform legal rules for law enforcement.‛ (emphasis added)).  
B. State v. Larocco 
¶22 In State v. Larocco a plurality of the supreme court (two 
justices concurring and one concurring only in the result) urged 
departure from continued reliance on federal jurisprudence as 
the basis for interpreting Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470–71. The plurality reasoned 
that although both federal and Utah courts had historically 
interpreted the automobile exception to require both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances, id. at 470, exigency had become 
essentially a given based on a too-simplistic notion about the 
ready mobility of automobiles, id. at 469. The Larocco plurality 
thus concluded that an automobile’s mere potential for mobility 
ought no longer to be sufficient to satisfy the exigency 
requirement under the Utah Constitution. Rather, a two-step 
process was required: first, it should be established that officers 
had probable cause for a search; then in order to meet the 
required level of exigency, ‚*t+he next step requires justification 
of the warrantless search by showing either that the 
procurement of a warrant would have jeopardized the safety of 
the police officers or that the evidence was likely to have been 
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lost or destroyed.‛ Id. at 470. In other words, for the automobile 
exception to apply, the State must go beyond the general concept 
of ready mobility and show exigency particularized to the actual 
circumstances at hand. Thus, in Larocco, there was probable 
cause for a search, but the State failed to show that the 
presumably stolen automobile, while operable and likely mobile, 
would no longer have been available to search if the officers had 
taken the time to obtain a warrant. As a result, the warrantless 
search was not justified. Id. at 470–71. 
¶23 But Larocco’s plurality status ‚represents the view of only 
two justices . . . and is therefore not the law of this state.‛ 
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1234 n.5. Accordingly, the holding from 
Watts remained ‚the law of this state.‛ See id.; see also State v. 
Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1121 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (‚Because Larocco 
was only a plurality opinion, its analysis is not binding.‛). 
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the plurality decision in 
Larocco signals our supreme court’s intent to interpret the state 
constitution to provide different protections than the federal 
constitution. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 996 n.3 (noting that 
‚a plurality opinion . . . does not establish precedent‛). A 
subsequent plurality decision, State v. Anderson, underscores this 
notion. 
C.   State v. Anderson 
¶24 In State v. Anderson, issued just months before Labron,5 the 
Utah Supreme Court was again asked to depart from its practice 
of interpreting in tandem the search and seizure requirements of 
the state and federal constitutions in the context of the 
automobile exception. See Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1235. But the 
Anderson plurality rejected the approach taken by the Larocco 
                                                                                                                    
5. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996), was issued on 
February 2, 1996, while Labron, 518 U.S. 938, was issued 
approximately five months later, on July 1, 1996. 
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plurality and affirmed that Utah would continue to track the 
federal path in this area: ‚Because this portion of Larocco 
coincides with federal law, we agree with those who joined the 
Larocco plurality that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
requires that warrantless searches of automobiles be justified by 
a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances.‛ Id. at 
1237. Based on this statement, Rigby urges us to acknowledge 
Anderson as the irrefutable last word on the issue. In other 
words, Rigby argues that even if Larocco’s more restrictive 
plurality approach is not binding, we should conclude at a 
minimum that the Anderson plurality has accurately articulated 
Utah law just prior to Labron as holding that probable cause 
alone is not sufficient to justify the warrantless search of an 
automobile but that exigent circumstances are also required. 
Rigby contends that the Anderson court ‚went into great detail to 
explain that under both the Federal and Utah constitutions the 
warrantless search of an automobile required ‘both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances.’‛ (Quoting Anderson, 910 P.2d 
at 1236.) 
¶25 While that is true, Anderson does not support Rigby’s 
position as strongly as he contends, because Rigby does not 
acknowledge the context in which that explanation occurred. 
Although the Anderson plurality recognized that in the past, 
federal Fourth Amendment law had been ‚the source of much 
confusion among judges, lawyers, and police,‛ it went on to 
explain that our supreme court ‚ha*s+ endeavored toward 
uniformity in the application of the search and seizure 
requirements of the state and federal constitutions, particularly 
since the respective provisions are practically identical,‛ 
cautioning that ‚*a+n opposite approach could lead to 
unfavorable results.‛ Id. at 1235–36 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). In accordance with this principle, 
recognizing that at the time Anderson was issued, federal law 
‚require*d+ that such a search be premised on probable cause 
and exigent circumstances,‛ id. at 1237, the plurality concluded 
that the Utah Constitution required the same: ‚*T+he Utah 
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Constitution requires that warrantless searches of automobiles 
be justified by a showing of probable cause and exigent 
circumstances,‛ id. Thus, rather than fixing the combination of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances as the invariable 
components of the automobile exception under the Utah 
Constitution, Anderson can be read to express the plurality’s 
view that the Utah Supreme Court had expressed a distinct and 
continuing preference to have Article 1, Section 14 interpreted 
consistently with the Fourth Amendment in order to avoid the 
‚unfavorable results‛ that a different approach ‚could lead to.‛ 
Id. at 1235 (‚For these reasons, Utah courts should construe 
article I, section 14 in a manner similar to constructions of the 
Fourth amendment except in compelling circumstances.‛ (citing, 
among other cases, Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 & n.8)).  
D.   The Current State of the Automobile Exception Under 
Utah Law 
¶26 The plurality decisions in Larocco and Anderson present 
two competing approaches. On the one hand, the Larocco 
plurality analyzes the automobile exception to require a 
complex, policy-based analysis giving due consideration to the 
principle that the Utah Constitution ought to be independently 
analyzed with the potential for affording Utah citizens greater 
liberties than the federal. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469–71. On the 
other hand, the Anderson plurality firmly rejects that approach 
and urges that the court instead adhere to the historical pattern 
of following the path of federal law to avoid confusion and 
‚unfavorable results.‛ Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1234–37. But 
although the pluralities in Larocco and Anderson began an 
internal dialogue that could eventually lead to changes in Utah’s 
approach, we are effectively left with Watts as the supreme 
court’s last majority expression, and therefore what appears to 
be the court’s last word on the automobile exception. And while 
Watts held that the automobile exception required both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances, its reasoning was firmly based 
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on the principle of tracking the path set by the United States 
Supreme Court. Watts, 750 P.2d at 1220–21 & n.8. 
¶27 Certainly, Rigby’s contention that Utah courts ought now 
to depart from the federal interpretive path and determine that 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides Utah 
citizens with more expansive rights than those guaranteed under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution finds 
resonance in the language of some prior cases. See State v. Brake, 
2004 UT 95, ¶ 16 n.2, 103 P.3d 699 (first citing Anderson, 910 P.2d 
at 1234–37; and then citing Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469–70) (declining 
‚the implicit invitation‛ inherent in the circumstances of the case 
‚to revisit the dormant but unresolved debate in this court over 
the merits of whether and when to depart from federal Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and chart our own course in the realm of 
search and seizure law based on the protections afforded by 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution‛); State v. DeBooy, 
2000 UT 32, ¶ 12, 996 P.2d 546 (‚While this court’s interpretation 
of article I, section 14 has often paralleled the United States 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, we 
have stated that we will not hesitate to give the Utah 
Constitution a different construction where doing so will more 
appropriately protect the rights of this state’s citizens.‛); Larocco, 
794 P.2d at 465 (‚*W+e have by no means ruled out the 
possibility of [drawing distinctions between the protections 
afforded by article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the 
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution].‛ (quoting 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8)); Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8 (‚In 
declining to depart in this case from our consistent refusal 
heretofore to interpret article I, section 14 of our constitution in a 
manner different from the fourth amendment to the federal 
constitution, we have by no means ruled out the possibility of 
doing so in some future case. Indeed, choosing to give the Utah 
Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove to be 
an appropriate method for insulating this state’s citizens from 
the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth 
amendment by the federal courts.‛). But the decades-long 
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pattern of Utah decisions following the lead of federal law in this 
area before Larocco and Anderson—a pattern acknowledged and 
applied in Watts—is established enough that the burden must be 
on the challenging party to persuade us that a change is 
justifiable, and Rigby has not carried that burden here. Rather, 
the strength of that pattern and the very intensity of the 
disagreement between the Larocco and Anderson pluralities deter 
us from concluding that the current court would mark Labron as 
Utah’s point of departure from the path of federal law on the 
automobile exception. 
¶28 And even were we tempted to do so,  
as an intermediate court of appeals, we would be 
reluctant, in any event, to become overly creative 
in fashioning a state constitutional rule different 
from the federal rule. Such a task lies more 
appropriately with the Utah Supreme Court as ‚the 
ultimate and final arbiter of the meaning of the 
provisions in the Utah Declaration of Rights and 
the primary protector of individual liberties.‛  
State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (first 
quoting Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1240 (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
result); then citing State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 95 n.7 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) (stating that any departure from Fourth Amendment 
case law ‚should be announced by our state’s supreme court, not 
this court‛), rev’d on other grounds, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)); cf. 
DIRECTV v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2015 UT 93, ¶¶ 44–46 
(declining to ‚embark on a constitutional*+ . . . journey‛ when 
asked to extend federal dormant commerce clause precedent 
because the United States Supreme Court’s current approach 
does not seem to point in that direction and because it is not the 
province of the Utah Supreme Court to embark on that journey). 
Accordingly, we decline to depart from the path of federal law 
and conclude that under the automobile exception, as 
interpreted in Labron, the law enforcement officers in this case 
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were only required to have probable cause to justify the search 
of Rigby’s vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement of either the federal or Utah constitutions. See State 
v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, ¶¶ 13–16, 173 P.3d 213. Because 
there is no dispute that the officers here had probable cause for a 
search, the trial court did not err in denying Rigby’s motion to 
suppress.6  
CONCLUSION 
¶29 For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial 
court is affirmed. 
 
                                                                                                                    
6. Because we follow Labron’s lead and conclude that no separate 
showing of exigent circumstances is required under the 
automobile exception, we do not reach Rigby’s argument that 
the availability of warrants by telephone or other electronic 
media means that there was no exigency here as a matter of law. 
Cf. State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, ¶ 60, 156 P.3d 771 (‚*P+ractical 
considerations associated with warrant acquisition remain 
central to inquiries into whether exigent circumstances justify a 
warrantless search.‛); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 
1990) (plurality opinion) (recognizing ‚*t+he amount of time 
necessary to obtain a warrant‛ is a factor used to ‚determin*e+ 
whether circumstances are exigent‛); City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 
P.2d 1384, 1391–92 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (identifying ‚the 
availability of a telephonic warrant‛ as one consideration when 
determining whether exigency exists).  
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State-by-State Constitution Comparison Chart 
 




 U.S. Const. amend IV The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 





Dec. 7, 1787 
Del. Const. art. I, § 6 
(Dec. 2, 1831) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or 
things, shall issue without describing them as particularly as 
may be, nor then, unless there be probable cause supported 







Dec. 12, 1787 
Penn. Const. art. I, § 8 
(Jan. 1, 1874) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or 
things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may 
be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or 







Dec. 18, 1787 
N.J. Const. art. I, § 6 
(Aug. 13, 1844) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 






                                            
 1 This Addendum sets forth the search and seizure provisions of the various states as of 1895.  
The date below the State represents its admission date.  The date below the state constitutional provision 
represents the version of that constitution.  Sources are generally from governmental, historical, or 
educational websites, including the NBER/University of Maryland State Constitutions Project, “a portal 
to the texts of the state constitutions of the United States.”  See www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu. 





Jan. 2, 1788 
Geo. Const. § 1, par. 
XVI (1877) 
(as ratified without 
subsequent 
amendments) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
except upon probable cause, supported by oath, or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place, or places, to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 http://www.cviog.uga.edu/Projects/gainfo/con1877b.htm (University of Georgia—Carl Vinson Institute of Government)  
5 CN 
Jan. 9, 1788 
Conn. Const. art. I, § 8 
(Oct. 12, 1818) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures, and 
no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or 
things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may 








Feb. 6, 1788 
Mass. Const. Part the 
First, art. XIV (1780) 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable 
searches, and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, 
and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary 
to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not 
previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order 
in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected 
places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to 
seize their property, be not accompanied with a special 
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or 
seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and 
with the formalities, prescribed by the laws. 
 http://www.founding.com/library/lbody.cfm?id=478&parent=475
7 MD 
Apr. 28, 1788 
Mary. Const. Dec. Rts. 
art. 26  
(Aug. 17, 1867) 
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search 
suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are 
grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search 
suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, 
without naming or describing the place, or the person in 
special, are illegal, an ought not to be granted. [Note: The 
Declaration of Rights to the 1867 Constitution includes 45 
"articles," and no sections. Because the constitution then 
continues with Article I, we have coded these articles as 












May 23, 1788 
S.C. Const. art. I, § 22 
(Apr. 16, 1868) 
All persons have a right to be secure from unreasonable 
searches or seizures of their persons, houses, papers or 
possessions. All warrants shall be supported by oath or 
affirmation, and the order of the warrant to a civil officer to 
make search or seizure in suspected places, or to arrest one 
or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, shall 
be accompanied with a special designation of the persons or 
objects of search, arrest or seizure; and no warrant shall be 








June 21, 1788 
N.H. Const. art. I, § 19 
(Sep. 5, 1792) 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable 
searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, 
and all his possessions; Therefore, All warrants to search 
suspected places, or arrest a person for examination or trial, 
in prosecutions for criminal matters, are contrary to this 
right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously 
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in a 
warrant to a civil officer to make search in suspected places, 
or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their 
property, be not accompanied with a special designation of 
the persons or object of search, arrest, or seizure; and no 
warrant ought to be issued but in cases and with the 







June 25, 1788 
Vir. Const. art. I, § 10 
(1870) 
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may 
be commanded to search suspected places without evidence 
of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not 
named, or whose offense is not particularly described and 
supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and 
ought not to be granted. 
 http://www.harbornet.com/rights/virginia.txt 
11 NY 
July 26, 1788 
N.Y. Const. (Nov. 6, 
1894) 
*No search protection provided.   
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/Search.aspx







N.C. Const. art. I, § 15 
(July 1, 1868) 
General warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be 
commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of 
the act committed, or to seize any persons not named, whose 
offence is not particularly described and supported by 








May 29, 1790 
R.I. Const. art. I, § 6 
(May 3, 1843) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers 
and possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but on 
complaint in writing, upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation and describing as nearly as may be, the 







Mar. 4, 1791 
Ver. Const. chap. I, 
art. 11 (as established 
July 9, 1793 and 
amended through Nov. 
5, 2002) 
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their 
houses, papers, and possessions, free from search or seizure; 
and therefore warrants, without oath[s] or affirmation[s] first 
made, affording sufficient foundation for them, and whereby 
any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to 
search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, 
his, her or their property, not particularly described, are 
contrary to that right, and ought not to be granted. 
 http://www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/const2.htm; http://vermont-archives.org/govhistory/constitut/con93.htm 
15 KY 
June 1, 1792 
Kent. Const. § 10 (as 
ratified on Aug. 3, 
1891, and revised Sep. 
28, 1891) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and possessions, from unreasonable search and seizure; and 
no warrant shall issue to search any place, or seize any 
person or thing, without describing them as nearly as may 
be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation.  
 http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/Legresou/constitu/010.htm





June 1, 1796 
Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7 
(adopted Feb. 23, 1870 
and ratified on the 





That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and 
seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer may 
be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence 
of the fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not 
named, whose offences are not particularly described and 
supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought 
not to be granted. 
 http://www.tngenweb.org/law/constitution1870.html
17 OH 
Mar. 1, 1803 
Ohio Const. art. I, § 14 
(ratified Mar. 10, 
1851) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and possessions, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person and things to be seized. 
 http://www.ohiohistory.org/onlinedoc/ohgovernment/constitution/cnst1851.html
18 LA 
Apr. 30, 1812 
Louis. Const. Bill Rts., 
Art. 2 (ratified Dec. 8, 
1879) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue 
except upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 







Dec. 11, 1816 
Ind. Const. art. I, § 11 
(ratified Nov. 1, 1851) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 





Dec. 10, 1817 
Miss. Const. art. III, § 
23 (adopted Nov. 1, 
1890) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and 
possessions from unreasonable seizure or search; and no 
warrant shall be issued without probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, specially designating the place to be 
searched and the person or thing to be seized. 
 http://www.sos.state.ms.us/ed_pubs/Constitution/2007/Mississippi%20Constitution.pdf; 
http://www.sos.state.ms.us/pubs/constitution/constitution.asp





Dec. 3, 1818 
Ill. Const. art. II, § 6 
(Aug. 8, 1870) 
 
art. I., § 6 (ratified 
1970) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
without probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 







Dec. 14, 1819 
Ala. Const. art. I, § 6 
(ratified Nov. 16, 
1875) 
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and possessions from unreasonable seizure or 
searches, and that no warrant shall issue to search any place, 
or to seize any person or thing, without probable cause, 





*Maine Const. art. I, § 
5 (1820) (last modified 
1/1/2003) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures; 
and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or 
thing, shall issue without a special designation of the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized, nor 





Missouri Const. art. II, 
§ 11 (1875) 
That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, 
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; 
and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or 
thing, shall issue without describing the place to be 
searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as nearly as 
may be; nor without probable cause, supported by written 
oath or affirmation. 
 http://www.moga.mo.gov/const/A01015.HTM 
25 AR 
June 15, 1836 
Ark. Const. art. II, § 
15 (1874) 
The right of the people of this State to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue, except upon probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
 http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/data/constitution/ArkansasConstitution1874.pdf





Jan. 26, 1837 
Mich. Const. art. VI, § 
26 (adopted Aug. 15, 
1850) 
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person 
shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No 
warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things, 
shall issue without describing them, or without probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation. 
 http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/historical/miconstitution1850.htm
27 FL 
Mar. 3, 1845 
Fla. Const. Decl. Rts., 
§ 22 (1885)  
 
*art. I, § 12 as 
amended in 1982 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and 
searches, shall not be violated, and no warrants issued but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place or places to be searched, 
and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized. 
 http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/conhist/1885con.html (Florida State University)
28 TX 
Dec. 29, 1845 
Tex. Const. art. I, § 9 
(1876) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and possessions from all unreasonable seizures or searches, 
and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or 
thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, 
nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.
 http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/IART01.html (University of Texas at Austin - Tarton Law Library) 
29 IA 
Dec. 28, 1846 
Iowa Const. art. I, § 8 
(1857) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and 
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons and things to be seized. 
 http://www.legis.state.ia.us/Constitution.html#a1s8
30 WI 
May 29, 1848 
Wisc. Const. art. I, § 
11 (1848) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
 http://www.legis.state.wi.us/rsb/unannotated_wisconst.pdf






Sep. 9, 1850 
Cal. Const. art. I, § 19 
(ratified 1849) (revised 
in 1879) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and 
searches, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons and things to be seized. 
 http://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/level3_const1849txt.html
32 MN 
May 11, 1858 
Minn. Const. art. I, § 
10 (adopted 1857) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or things to be seized. 
 http://www.mnhs.org/library/constitution/transcriptpages/rt.html; http://www.mnhs.org/library/constitution/index.html 
33 OR 
Feb. 14, 1859 
Ore. Const. art. I, § 9 
(1859) 
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable search or seizure; and no warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
 http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/constitution/orig/bill_rights3.htm
34 KS 
Jan. 29, 1861 
Kan. Const. Bill of 
Rts, § 15 (adopted at 
Wyandotte July 29, 
1859) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons and 
property against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be 
inviolate, and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person and property to be 
seized. 
 http://www.kshs.org/research/collections/documents/online/wyandotteconstitution.htm#billrights (Kansas State Historical Society)
35 WV 
June 20, 1863 
W.V. Const. art. II, § 3 
(ratified Apr. 24, 
1862) 
The right of the citizens to be secure in their houses, 
persons, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated. No warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons and things to be seized. 
 http://www.wvculture.org/HISTORY/statehood/constitution.html (West Virginia Division of Culture and History);  
http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/showASM.aspx?CID=225&AID=2977&SID=27352&MID=-1&key=search 





Oct. 31, 1864 
Nev. Const. art. I, § 18 
(ratified Sep. 1, 1864) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and 
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
on probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, 
particularly describing the place or places to be searched, 
and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized. 
 http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Const/NvConst.html#Art1
37 NE 
Mar. 1, 1867 
Neb. Const. art. I, § 7 
(1875). 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
 http://uniweb.legislature.ne.gov/legaldocs/view.php?page=c0101007000
38 CO 
Aug. 1, 1876 
Colo. Const. art. II, § 7 
(adopted by 
convention Mar. 14, 
1876)  
That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, 
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; 
and no warrant to search any place or seize any person or 
thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched, 
or the person or thing to be seized, as near as may be, nor 
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
reduced to writing. 
 http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/doit/archives/constitution/1876.pdf
39 ND 
Nov. 2, 1889 
N.D. Const. art. I, § 18 
(Aug. 17, 1889) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons and things to be seized. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/showASM.aspx?CID=257&AID=3637&SID=34752&MID=-1&key=search 
 
(Univ. of Maryland NBER/Maryland State Constitutions Project)
40 SD 
Nov. 2, 1889 
S.D. Const. art. VI, § 
11 (ratified Oct. 1, 
1889) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches any 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issued 
but upon probable cause supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='SD'&CID=223&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895





Nov. 8, 1889 
Mont. Const. art. III, § 
7 (ratified Oct. 1, 
1889) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, 
and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no 
warrant to search any place or seize any person or thing 
shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or 
the person or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause, 





Wash. Const. art. I, § 7 
(approved Oct. 1, 
1889) 
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his 
home invaded, without authority of law. 
 http://www.secstate.wa.gov/history/constitution_view.aspx?i=1889
43 ID 
July 3, 1890 
Ida. Const. art. I, § 17 
(ratified July 3, 1890) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing 
to be seized.   
 http://dfm.idaho.gov/cdfy2007/OtherDocuments/id-constitution.pdf
44 WY 
July 10, 1890 
Wyo. Const. art. I, § 4 
(ratified Nov. 5, 1889) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to 
be seized.   
 http://soswy.state.wy.us/informat/07Const.pdf 
45 UT 
Jan. 4, 1896 
Utah Const. art. I, § 14 
(adopted May 8, 1895 
and ratified 1895) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
 http://www.le.utah.gov/documents/conconv/66.htm 
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ST A TE OF UTAH 
ORDER DENYfNG DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 135100370 
Judge Brian G. Cannell 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Having reviewed said motion with accompanying memorandum, the State's 
memorandum in opposition, and having conducted a hearing on the matter, the Court 
finds the following: 
Defendant and the State have stipulated to certain facts of the case. On or about 
March 28, 2013, Defendant was arrested after a search of his vehicle revealed marijuana 
and drug paraphernalia, including a urine sample that tested positive for THC marijuana. 
Defendant was initially stopped for a stop sign violation. After contacting the Defendant 
(driver), the responding officer could immediately detect the odor of both burnt and fresh 
marijuana coming from the vehicle. The Officer could also detect other physical 
indicators of recent marijuana use. A short time later a canine unit arrived and the canine 
positively indicated on the vehicle. Subsequently, a warrantless search was conducted, 
wherein drugs and drug paraphernalia were located inside the vehicle. 
Defendant concedes that prior to the warrantless search of his vehicle, probable 
cause existed to believe that Defendant was in possession of controlled substances due to 
the odor observed by the officer as well as the hit on the car by the canine. Defendant 
also stipulates that Defendant was lawfully stopped pursuant to a traffic violation. 
Defendant argues that despite the existence of probable cause, the State has failed to 
establish that exigency existed to justify the officers in using the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement as a means to search the vehicle. 
Defendant argues that according to State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, (Utah 1990), 
the State has not met its burden to show that exigent circumstances existed because at the 
scene of the search there were multiple officers present, the occupants of the vehicle 
including Defendant were cooperative, and the officers had the technological capability 
in their police cruisers to quickly obtain a warrant at the scene prior to the search, thereby 
creating circumstances that were not exigent in nature. 
The State however relies on State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, (Utah 1996), 
wherein the facts are analogous to the present case. In Anderson the defendant's vehicle 
was stopped and probable cause and exigent circumstances existed and the subsequent 
search was found to be lawful. The Utah Supreme Court "has ruled that exigent 
circumstances exist when the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's 
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained." Id. at 1237. 
2 
Despite the availability of equipment in the police cruisers at the scene, probable 
cause and exigent circumstances existed in this case as a matter of fact. The officers 
could smell marijuana, the canine unit hit on the vehicle, which further established 
probable cause, and because the vehicle was mobile and the occupants were alerted to 
police presence, exigent circumstances existed and the search validly fell under the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
This Court also finds that as probable cause existed to question and search the 
Defendant for illegal drugs, the vehicle is a natural extension of the person of the 
Defendant. This Court also finds that although the arresting officer had the technological 
means to attempt to obtain a warrant prior to the search of the vehicle, this Court will not 
burden officers with using their mobile technology just because it exists in their vehicles. 
This Court further finds that under the totality of the circumstances and in balancing the 
interests of the State and the Defendant's privacy, the search of the vehicle in this matter 
was reasonable and was therefore lawful and valid. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
Defendant's motion to suppress is denied as to the evidence obtained by law 
enforcement officers during the warrantless search of defendant's vehicle, as the search 
was reasonable under the circumstances and such evidence was lawfully obtained under 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
DATED this J\(2 day of __ ~-=-.;:;.___. ____ , 2013 
District Court Judge 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I emailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the 
defendant's attorney, Brandon Smith, to his email address of brandon@dtsattomeys.com. 
A~o~ 
Legal Assistant 
Dated November 7, 2013 
